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This collection consists of five contributions presented as plenaries at a con-
ference, ‘Theory Meets Crisis’, held at the Robert Schuman Centre, European
University Institute, in July 2016. The organizers of the conference asked
leading scholars of varieties of capitalism, democracy, redistributional politics,
European integration and political parties to engage the theoretical impli-
cations of Europe’s multiplex crisis. To what extent and how, we asked, has
the European crisis confirmed, undermined or reshaped theoretically
grounded expectations in these fields? Beyond the confirmation or disconfir-
mation of particular hypotheses, does the crisis impel us to take a fresh look at
comparative politics?
Much has been written about Europe’s crises in the past five years. Most of
this employs extant theory to shed light on the crisis and its broader political
and economic consequences. The contributions in this collection turn this per-
spective 180 degrees around. Each asks what one can learn from the crisis for
our understanding of political institutions and behavior. How have the crises
shifted problematics of research? What new puzzles and questions have come
to the fore? What anomalies does the confrontation between new facts and
extant theories throw up, and what novel insights emerge?
Each plenary presentation was flanked by two rapporteurs who provided
extended comments: Dorothee Bohle and Torben Iversen on varieties of capit-
alism; Catherine de Vries and Herbert Kitschelt on democracy; Silja Häuser-
mann and John Stephens on redistribution; Chris Bickerton and Peter
Katzenstein on European integration; and Jan Rovny and Frank Schimmelfen-
nig on political parties. While each author in this collection takes full respon-
sibility for their published article, we would like to acknowledge that the
individuals listed above are an intrinsic part of the project, and their advice
was invaluable in revision.
The crisis in the title of this collection – the euro crisis and the migration
crisis – raises, in sharp form, a double problematic that lies at the core of con-
temporary comparative politics, namely the response of national actors to
international pressures, and the response of international actors to domestic
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pressures. This challenge is faced across the board in political science, but it is
particularly acute in the study of Europe. In no other continent are inter-
national and domestic decision-making so densely intertwined. Each of the
contributions in this collection analyzes the effects of the crisis as a multilevel
process.
The contributions raise this in several guises:
. Comparative political economy. The core argument of the varieties of capit-
alism (VoC) approach is that complementary institutions within countries
lead to disparate responses to economic interdependence. The establish-
ment of a common currency in the eurozone puts the spotlight on this
claim, and the resulting divergence in response between North and
South is in line with VoC. Under the crisis, the pressure for macroeconomic
adjustment in the South has become a demand for major political-economic
reform. What insights can VoC offer, and how might the theory be extended
to explain the current impasse in adjustment to monetary union?
. Inequality and redistribution. The literature on the politics of redistribution
has focused on its domestic determinants. What is the role of macroeco-
nomic conditions, and in particular, how does political support for redistri-
bution respond to economic crisis? To what extent does an international
economic crisis constrain domestic policy choice?
. Democracy. Economic crisis is perceived to undermine support for democ-
racy because it weakens democratic performance. However, the experience
of the crisis suggests that citizens may attest strong support for the prin-
ciples of liberal democracy at the same time that they are dissatisfied
with the performance of their democratic government. This suggests
that we must reconsider the theoretical relationship between diffuse
regime support and specific support, and it raises the possibility that the
two may vary independently.
. European integration. The major theories of European integration, neofunc-
tionalism and intergovernmentalism, were designed to explain the process
by which member states achieved co-operative outcomes. Postfunctional-
ism counterposes the mobilization of exclusive national identity to func-
tional pressures for co-operation. How can these theories be adapted to
explain the steps taken by the European Union (EU) in response to the
euro crisis and the failure of reform in response to the migration crisis?
. Political parties and party systems. Theories of democratic party competition
explore how political parties take positions on issues as a strategic response
to voter preferences. Yet the response of political parties to the crisis
suggests that their programmatic positioning is path dependent. This pro-
vides an opening for reassessing cleavage theory, which suggests that
democratic responsiveness is an emergent phenomenon that operates at
the level of the party system rather than its constituent political parties.
Party systems are responsive to the extent that the structure of party com-
petition reflects prominent social divisions.
Peter Hall (2017) examines the tension between national variation and
international collaboration in the eurozone on the varieties of capitalism
premise that the comparative advantage of an economy depends on path
dependent institutional complementarities. This powerfully illuminates the
structural weakness of European monetary union and the difficulties of adjust-
ment. Monetary union juxtaposed distinct growth models: a Northern export-
led model based on co-ordinated markets; and a Southern domestic-led
model based on mixed markets. Contrary to those who had anticipated con-
vergence, monetary union accentuated the effect of institutional variation,
producing wide current account imbalances, which fed an asset bubble in
the South. The global liquidity crisis exposed and intensified structural
North–South imbalances, and once the bubble burst it provoked sovereign
debt crises that pushed the eurozone to the brink.
Hall contends that the crisis has challenged VoC theorists to engage more
intensively with Eastern and Southern Europe and, most importantly, to pro-
blematize the effects of EU-wide policy on divergent national models and
pressures for reform. Reform itself raises fundamental issues for the VoC
research agenda relating to the role of coalitional politics among producer
groups and the constraining role of postfunctionalist pressures arising from
the revolt against globalization.
Jonas Pontusson and David Weisstanner (2017) argue that international
macroeconomic cycles set the parameters for domestic redistributive
choice. International economic developments are common forces that power-
fully affect the structure of inequality and demand for redistribution. At the
same time, the responsiveness of redistribution to inequality shocks varies
along with political choices concerning the generosity and inclusiveness of
social insurance benefits. The Great Recession in Europe offers the most
recent illustration. Using Luxembourg Income Study and EU-SILC data, Pon-
tusson and Weisstanner show that governments in North-west Europe have
turned less to compensatory redistribution than in the economic downturn
of the early 1990s. This reflects the structure of inequality that concentrates
unemployment and poverty risk among low-educated immigrants and min-
orities, and which, correspondingly, leads middle-income citizens to be
more willing to cut redistribution to the poor. The logic extends to Southern
Europe, but because the euro crisis there deepened insecurity and inequality
across broad sections of society, the political outcome was diametrically differ-
ent: public support for redistribution rose sharply, and so did redistributive
policy, at least until the eurozone imposed austerity.
Hanspeter Kriesi (2017) finds that the Great Recession confirms the theory
of the ‘critical citizen’. This theory claims that citizens meaningfully distinguish
between support for democratic principles and evaluation of democratic prac-
tice. While bad economic times make citizens more critical of democratic prac-
tice, they also reduce tolerance for poor governance and can bolster support
for democratic principles. The theory takes issue with David Easton’s view that
diffuse systemic support is, in the long run, the product of evaluations of
outputs and performance. Using fine-grained survey data from a 2012 Euro-
pean Social Survey, Kriesi finds a pronounced divergence in democratic satis-
faction across Europe alongside robust principled support for democracy. In
North-west Europe, satisfaction and support continue to go hand in hand;
in Southern Europe satisfaction drops precipitously while principled support
is stable; and in Central and Eastern Europe, the crisis has reinforced a long-
standing gap between satisfaction and support. Interestingly, the most
adversely affected citizens have the most maximalist conceptions of democ-
racy. By creating critical citizens, the economic crisis actually contributes to
the strengthening of democratic principles.
Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2017) probe how theories of European inte-
gration fare in explaining the partially successful response of the EU to the
euro crisis and the subsequent blockage in dealing with the Schengen
crisis. They observe that the initial response to the euro crisis used intergo-
vernmentalist means to achieve neofunctionalist ends: government leaders
sought to contain politicization by delegating fiscal powers to non-majoritar-
ian supranational institutions. The upshot was a marked centralization of fiscal
and economic authority which produced a postfunctionalist backlash that
compressed the winset for intergovernmental bargaining on the migration
crisis. In the face of an insiders versus outsiders narrative that amplifies exclu-
sive nationalism, EU decision-making failed and government after govern-
ment retreated into unilateral national decision-making.
Börzel and Risse argue that each of these theories has something to offer,
but no one of them provides a sufficient explanation across the board.
Together, liberal intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism can account
for the response to the euro crisis. Postfunctionalism offers a good account
of the failure to respond to refugee flows with a co-ordinated response,
and its emphasis on constraining dissensus is a necessary ingredient in
explaining Europe’s problem-solving challenge overall. However, postfunc-
tionalism tends to underestimate the resilience of the EU: the relative insula-
tion of EU non-majoritarian institutions from politicization; the capacity of
élites to circumvent the constraining dissensus and to learn from mistakes;
and, most importantly, the double-edged character of identity and its recep-
tiveness to framing. A theory of European integration, according to Börzel and
Risse, needs to take up under what conditions, how, and to what effect, these
identities can be framed in support of transnational governance.
Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks (2017) suggest that we need to reassess
some basic priors about political parties and party systems in the light of
Europe’s crises. The Downsian assumption that political parties reposition
themselves in response to changing voters’ preferences is challenged by
the decline in the vote share of mainstream parties across Europe and the
rise of green and radical right parties. These parties are rooted in a new
divide –which Hooghe and Marks describe as a transnational cleavage – acti-
vated by a nationalist reaction against the European Union and immigration.
Cleavage theory assumes that political parties arise in response to critical junc-
tures and that they are programmatically rooted. Party systems respond to
major exogenous change by producing new parties that compete on new
divides. Europe’s crises are critical junctures that introduce new divisions
into party systems.
However, Lipset and Rokkan’s (1967) original theory cannot be trans-
planted wholesale. Its core contribution is to offer a coherent explanation
for the inelasticity of party positioning, the relatively high incidence of div-
isions within mainstream parties on Europe and immigration, and, more gen-
erally, the failure of mainstream parties to encompass voters mobilized on
transnational issues. The claim that party systems are frozen, which Lipset
and Rokkan themselves soon dropped, is self-evidently extraneous. More
importantly, the notion that citizens are locked in bounded, organized, and
self-conscious groups no longer holds. However, the question of persistence
remains on the table. How durable are the issues that underpin the new clea-
vage? How durable are attachments of voters to challenging political parties?
Has a period of de-alignment been superseded by a new structuration of
parties and attachments?
Although the focus of these contributions was on the European Union and
its attendant crises, the scholarly insights of the collection are of value beyond
the study of Europe, because the EU is a laboratory for the management or
failure to manage interdependence. As the world is becoming ever more
complex and the functional pressures for collective solutions more pressing,
these contributions underline the importance of domestic political anchorage
for transnational politics and policy.
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